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Revolution Blues: The Reconstruction of Health and Safety Law as 
‘Common-Sense’ Regulation 
PAUL ALMOND
*
 
This paper reviews the last five years of Coalition Government policymaking in 
relation to occupational health and safety law. It shows that the most significant and 
influential element of this activity has been the reframing of the wider regulatory 
system according to a dominant ideological paradigm of ‘common-sense’ regulation, 
to the detriment of other considerations and interests. A social constructionist 
framework assists in setting out the means through which this new ‘symbolic 
universe’ of regulatory possibility has been constructed and promulgated within the 
policymaking arena. In particular, it identifies the key role played by processes of 
deliberative regulatory engagement in the construction and development of this 
approach, and identifies the inherent vulnerability of ‘thin’ forms of deliberation to 
this sort of application.  
INTRODUCTION 
Like many other fields of government activity, the last five years have seen those involved in 
the regulation of health and safety in the United Kingdom having to contend with the 
challenges posed by a sustained economic recession and a crisis of the public finances.
1
 The 
institutional change heralded by the election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
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government in 2010, and a subsequent shift towards a new ‘politics of austerity’, have led to 
a ‘rolling back’ of regulatory resourcing and formal intervention, as well as reform of the 
legal and institutional frameworks which govern regulatory activity.
2
 Together, these 
developments might be read as a product of external circumstances which have conspired to 
compromise the foundations of the existing regulatory structure. But this is only a partial 
explanation for the changes that have taken place during the last five years, in that it 
overlooks the profoundly ideological character of many of these changes. These post-2010 
policy developments have profoundly reshaped both the substantive content of the health and 
safety regulatory system, and also the tenor of social debate around this issue. As such, and as 
the current Government’s term of office comes to an end, the time is ripe for an assessment 
and review of some key features of the last five years of policymaking in this area. 
These recent developments merit attention because they provide an instructive example of a 
particular dynamic of reform. A pre-existing commitment to specific political values, such as 
deregulation and business freedom (which, it is claimed, reflect public preferences for 
economic liberalism), has been translated into policy in a particularly pervasive manner 
which has reframed the debate about the form that regulation ought to take. Perhaps unlike 
previous eras of government hostility towards health and safety regulation, when opposition 
was at least recognised and understood as such, this more recent period has seen the creation 
of a new orthodoxy, or ‘common-sense’,3 of regulation which sets firm parameters around 
what is possible and permissible in terms of future policy, and which excludes alternatives 
that do not conform to this model. It will be argued that this process of agenda-setting can be 
understood in social constructionist terms as the creation of a ‘symbolic universe’, an all-
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encompassing body of meaning and common-sense reality, around the issue.
4
 On this 
reading, the conditions of a dominant (self-)regulatory paradigm have come to be accepted as 
part of the background against which policymaking occurs, internalising a set of fundamental 
assumptions that narrow the range of possibilities that regulation can pursue. 
This paper sets out the different stages through which this process of social construction has 
occurred. It shows how, via experimentation, interaction, institutionalization, and 
internalization, a particular vision of regulation has been advanced. This has been achieved 
via the adoption of principles of deliberative regulation as a means of bringing external 
considerations into the policymaking process and populating the regulatory landscape with 
language and ideas (such as regulatory myths)
5
 that reframe core debates to reflect what are 
assumed to be widely-held ‘common-sense’ views of regulation. While the notion of basing 
legitimate policymaking on deliberative input from external stakeholders is widely-accepted 
as a principle of ‘good government’, it is also vulnerable to distortion when consultation is 
undertaken without safeguarding the validity of the input gathered. This paper shows that this 
linking of regulatory policy, government ideology, and ‘public preference’, has resulted in 
the entrenchment, rather than the offsetting, of a particular, detrimental, agenda for the future 
of health and safety regulation. 
THE REGULATORY CONTEXT: A CHANGING PARADIGM? 
A wealth of policy changes, reviews, and reforms have taken place within the field of health 
and safety regulation since 2010, and most of these developments have been characterised by 
a common preoccupation with a particular conception of ‘social concern’ about health and 
safety regulation. These developments have taken place against the backdrop of more than 
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fifteen years of government review, reform, and debate about the form and function of the 
regulatory system. For example, the introduction of Regulatory Impact Assessments and the 
Better Regulation Executive in 1998-99
6
 placed procedural controls on the decision-making 
processes of regulators, and the Hampton and Macrory reviews of 2005-6
7
 promoted a view 
of regulation as a risk-based process of compliance-seeking, using targeted interventions on 
the basis of focused risk evaluations so as to pursue desired regulatory outcomes in a less 
burdensome manner.
8
 These two reviews (commissioned by HM Treasury and the Cabinet 
Office respectively) looked at regulatory practices, not just in the sphere of health and safety, 
but across all national and local regulators that hold inspection and enforcement functions, 
with the explicit aim of promoting systems of oversight that were more compatible with the 
maintenance of business efficiency, flexibility, and economic competitiveness. This burden 
reduction focused on cutting proactive regulatory inspections by one-third, and limiting the 
use of criminal prosecution to a smaller number of cases involving a few ‘bad apples’. 
On one level, the Hampton and Macrory vision fitted well with what the HSE (Health and 
Safety Executive, the UK’s safety regulator) was already doing,9 and also reflected existing 
practices in other regulatory jurisdictions and domains, thereby suggesting a high degree of 
continuity in the overarching approach and rationality of the regulatory system.
10
 This view 
of regulatory offending as exceptional, and of wide-ranging intervention as an inefficient use 
of resources, reflects many of the assumptions found within Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
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regulatory pyramid model, an influential reading of the regulatory landscape in which 
interventions are explicitly weighed against competing economic and public interests.
11
 The 
preference of the Labour Government of the period 1997-2010 for “risk-tolerant 
deregulation”12 in the health and safety sphere led to significant reductions in HSE’s 
resourcing, with a decline in rates of inspection from 75,272 in 1999/2000 to 23,004 in 
2008/9 as the regulatory regime became more targeted, which included a post-Hampton drop 
of 50 per cent between 2004-7.
13
 Relatedly, rates of enforcement action also fell during this 
period; the emphasis on the need to remove “burdens from business”14 meant that reform 
was explicitly linked to the reduction of the state’s substantive commitments as a regulator, 
leading to a renewed emphasis upon private and market-based regulatory provision.
15
 
At the same time, however, this new risk-based paradigm has had to coexist uneasily with 
many of the longstanding features and assumptions of the British health and safety regime. 
Since its inception in modern form, via the Robens Report of 1972
16
 and the subsequent 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the principles of proportional, risk-based self-regulation 
have gone hand-in-hand with a commitment to generality and breadth of scope, universalism 
and inclusiveness of application, the pursuit of minimum standards, and a collaborative, 
consensual approach to regulation.
17
 The new laws were to embed a basic level of attainment 
and involvement in health and safety management across all British workplaces, thereby 
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raising expectations and increasing the profile of the issue. And while Robens envisaged that 
the targeting of resources would be important, this reflected a desire to spread the benefits of 
regulation as far as possible, and to greatest effect, rather than an ingrained rejection of the 
notion of regulation.
18
 Before more recent iterations of the risk-based regulatory paradigm 
recast interventionism and enforcement as signs of inefficiency and unreasonableness, they 
were widely regarded as reflecting the virtues of proactivity and the capacity of regulators to 
manage relations with duty-holders.
19
 
It must be acknowledged that health and safety regulation has never been applied with the 
fullness and degree of proactivity that the Robens ideal might suggest, and that there has been 
much continuity in the way that it has been addressed by successive governments over the 
last forty years.
20
 And yet it is possible to detect a degree of ‘newness’ in the approaches of 
politicians, policymakers, and the media to health and safety in recent years: more critical, 
and more often on a normative, not just empirical level; more focused on the relationship 
between the regulatory framework and the wider social world; and more open to airing these 
criticisms in public.
21
 As Hampton and Macrory demonstrated, there has also been a renewed 
emphasis on the toleration of risk as a principle of good government; whereas in the past, the 
creation of areas of deregulated risk was a side-effect of an ideological commitment to a 
smaller state apparatus, it is now viewed as valuable in itself to allow those areas of risk to 
exist, and to be managed by individual agents rather than curtailed outright.
22
 Risk-taking is 
lauded (with, as in the case of the 2008 financial crash, sometimes disastrous consequences) 
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and the notion of the private sphere as somewhere that government (and hence regulators) 
should not tread. The outcome of this shift has been the reconceptualisation of regulation as 
“a second-best choice for social organization” and “an always regrettable means of 
correcting market failure”,23 something that is considered illegitimate and undesirable by the 
public and policymakers alike. This notion of regulation as logically bounded and undesirable 
in certain fields of human endeavour is culturally as well as formally recognised, and is now 
the prevailing social narrative around health and safety regulation.
24
 It has also formed a key 
component of policy rhetoric around the retrenchment of the regulatory framework, both via 
the Hampton/Macrory agenda, and via subsequent government initiatives since 2010. 
FRAMING A SYMBOLIC UNIVERSE OF ‘COMMON SENSE’ 
How has this new vision of regulation come to exert the influence over policy that it now 
wields, and why is the notion of regulation as illegitimate in relation to certain areas of risk 
and activity so ubiquitous? One way of understanding this process is as an example of 
‘consensus mobilization’, or ‘framing’, as a form of social meaning creation.25 Framing 
involves the generation of an interpretive schema to define a problem by “select[ing] some 
aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient”.26 In this way, a social reality 
is constructed which works to shape subsequent interpretation of that particular issue. While 
the majority of work around framing has looked at these processes within either social 
movements or media agendas, the study of wider cultural processes (such as the emergence 
of a new understanding of health and safety) leads onto discussion of more expansive notions 
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of social constructionism. This term connotes a view of social reality as the manufactured 
outcome of social processes of subjective interpretation and objective sharing of meaning. 
These shared meanings constitute a commonly-understood and experienced social reality 
which is taken-for-granted by the participants in it.
27
 The construction of these cultural 
meanings is an ongoing, dynamic process involving conversation, debate, and testing, in 
order to ensure that they convincingly explain experienced reality.  
A crucial role in the development of a socially constructed reality is played by widely-
accepted ‘common-sense’ knowledge forms, pragmatic explanatory schemes that contribute 
to the social construction of a “world of everyday life...taken for granted as reality”.28  These 
knowledge forms, such as proverbs, moral maxims, and legends, give cohesive meaning to 
disparate institutional practices and turn latent, easily understood examples of reality into a 
coherent whole. As it becomes objectively formalised, this explanatory scheme becomes a 
“symbolic universe”, legitimating existing institutions and setting the agenda for, and limits 
of what is possible through, the exercise of power, which must occur within the scope of that 
universe.
29
 Four crucial stages have been identified in this process, and together, they provide 
a useful framework for understanding how recent government reforms have reshaped the 
social reality of what ‘health and safety’ means, on both a policymaking and public level.30 
The first stage, ‘experimentation’, involves individual sense-making, as a specific perception 
of a particular situation or experience is developed based on first-hand exposure to it. The 
social phenomena thus experienced are transformed into a tentative, developmental, 
understanding of reality, which is subjectively meaningful only for those who hold it. Within 
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the regulatory context, this involves the emergence of new narratives within public, media, 
and official debate about what health and safety signifies. 
The second stage, ‘interaction’, involves the “objectivation” of these subjective meanings as 
they are given concrete and external significance via their expression in the world of 
interpersonal communication.
31
 Discussion, debate, and agreement aggregate individual 
subjective perceptions into a shared objective reality of norms and common sense. In this 
way, understandings of reality which are individually meaningful are collectivised into 
mutually meaningful norms. As the next section of this paper explains, processes of 
deliberative regulation
32
 facilitate the creation of shared understandings about regulation and 
their externalisation via consultative and policymaking forums. The third component of 
Berger and Luckmann’s model is ‘institutionalization’, where these aggregated perceptions 
are established more formally as a component of institutional norms, behaviours, and 
expectations. Socially generated understandings are officially recognised and objectified as 
components of “organizational [societal] consciousness”.33 In regulatory terms, this 
involves formalisation via official, expert scientific discussion and evaluation, and the 
subsequent creation of policy that reflects these understandings. 
The final stage of the process is ‘internalization’, or the acceptance of formalized norms, 
standards, and expectations as basic assumptions, or as ‘common sense’. The understandings 
generated become external, objective social reality, shaping perceptions and acting as a limit 
on the range of possibilities that can be pursued through future decision-making. New 
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members are socialised into this way of seeing so that their “natural attitude to this world 
corresponds to the natural attitude of others” and they “share a common sense about its 
reality”.34 This notion of common sense, as shared knowledge embedded in self-evident 
routines of everyday life, is centrally important to the creation of symbolic universes. As 
Geertz reminds us, however, ‘common sense’ is a constructed cultural system which reflects 
conscious determinations about its value as an explanatory schema.
35
 Decisions about what 
constitutes common sense are value-loaded and reflect one particular way of viewing the 
world – everything is what it is, practicality is important, and expertise is not. The idea of 
‘common sense’ is central to the Coalition Government’s thinking on health and safety 
regulation, and has been cited as a fundamental value that regulation should aspire to. The 
intertwining of health and safety and common sense is not new,
36
 but recent developments 
have explicitly used the idea of common sense as a restrictive and critical limit on regulation; 
policymakers have endeavoured to engage with representations of public common sense, and 
use the interaction stages of the meaning-generation process to form and consolidate one 
particular world-view. As such, it is necessary to consider the relationship between regulatory 
policymaking and public deliberation and opinion-formation in more detail. 
THE NOTION OF DELIBERATIVE REGULATION 
The concept of deliberative regulation draws on democratic social theory (including the work 
of Jürgen Habermas)
37
 to posit a model of regulation as a forum within which institutional 
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outcomes are grounded in participatory public discourses.
38
 By establishing mechanisms to 
allow for the participation of a range of social actors in the regulatory process, this model 
seeks to ensure that the outcomes of decision-making are both more responsible, in the sense 
of taking account of a wider range of interests, and more responsive, in that they reflect 
public concerns more directly.
39
 In a world where regulatory agencies are increasingly 
fragmented in structure and function, and faced with regulating an increasingly complex and 
contested set of risk issues, they are unable to retain a monopoly on ‘rightness’, and so must 
seek input from others in order to transcend their own particularism.
40
 On the one hand, this 
reflects a shift towards responsive law that is instrumental, altering behaviour in pursuit of 
democratically-expressed public interest goals.
41
 Deliberative engagement provides a 
responsive means of determining the goals to be pursued via a dispassionate bureaucratic 
process.
42
 At the same time, it justifies the decisions taken, democratising them and ensuring 
“the permeability of private organizational systems and social power directly to civil 
society”,43 acting as a driver of good regulation and breeding corporate virtue.44 
This recognition of the potential value of deliberative regulatory input has led to the 
widespread acceptance of such measures as a contemporary norm of ‘good governance’,45 
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preventing perceived democratic deficits from undermining systems of regulation dominated 
by technical expertise.
46
 Within the UK, notions of deliberative regulation have been 
harnessed as part of a wider drive towards accountability and an open, flexible, ‘non-
majoritarian’ state infrastructure.47 To these ends, the British Government has undertaken to 
apply a consultative, deliberative approach to regulation, centred on impact assessment and 
stakeholder engagement as means of broadening the base of evidence-led decision-making.
48
 
In the case of impact assessments, this takes the form of evidence as to the weighting of the 
positive and negative effects of interventions;
49
 in the case of stakeholder engagement, this 
involves gathering meaningful input from those affected by reform. Both approaches involve 
providing policymakers with input that “allow the Government to make informed decisions 
on matters of policy, to improve the delivery of public services, and to improve the 
accountability of public bodies”.50 
The crucial issue which arises in relation to the notion of deliberative regulatory engagement 
is one of depth and quality; it is not necessarily the case that any form of public consultation 
will render a policymaking process ‘deliberative’.51 As discussed previously, the concept of 
deliberative regulation is premised upon ‘thick’ forms of engagement which are participatory, 
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and which promote consensus and intersubjective understanding.
52
 Policy outcomes are thus 
legitimised as a form of action taken in the ‘public interest’, and are embedded within their 
social contexts and protected from domination by economic and bureaucratic power.
53
 In 
order to be regarded as truly deliberative, public debate must be rational and truthful, open 
and inclusive, and ongoing or revisable in nature.
54
 Only under these conditions can 
processes be said to be sufficiently non-hierarchical, fair, and mutual to allow all participants 
to transcend their particular standpoint and ensure that attitudes are moderated towards 
consensus.
55
 For these reasons, deliberative engagement has the capacity to perform a 
fundamentally important role within the ‘interaction’ stage of Berger and Luckmann’s model, 
turning subjective perceptions into a shared objective reality. In particular, the emphasis on 
the mutual adjustment of perceptions at this stage is consistent with the pursuit of 
intersubjective understanding that deliberative regulatory engagement typically involves.  
In practice, the conditions for ‘thick’ deliberation are structurally and institutionally difficult 
to achieve because participatory forums that allow for this kind of engagement are so 
resource-intensive. This approach also assumes a degree of epistemological proximity 
between parties which may not exist; the views expressed may be too polarised to allow for 
common understandings to emerge.
56
 Crucially, there is also an assumption that deliberative 
processes are open to all, whereas in reality different groups are able to access these forums 
to different degrees, depending on the levels of social and cultural power they possess.
57
 This 
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means that requirements which are intended to protect the quality of participation 
systematically disadvantage those interests which are less able to organise professional 
representation. Partly as a result of these problems, many attempts to implement mechanisms 
of deliberative engagement reflect what may be described as ‘thin’ rather than ‘thick’ 
versions of this approach.
58
 Whereas thick conceptions reflect the mutual features of 
deliberative discourse, thin versions retain a commitment to the hierarchical development of 
regulatory goals which are then subjected to democratic approval. The policy-making process 
is pluralistic, with different interest groups having input via (for example) the submission of 
evidence or participation in a discussion forum. This ensures that outcomes reflect the 
aggregation of preferences, but not necessarily formal participation in policy-creation. 
Instead, the emphasis is on good-quality, rather than substantively fair, regulation, subjecting 
bureaucratic decision-making to public scrutiny.
59
  
This is the kind of stakeholder engagement solicited by the UK government, where the 
emphasis has been placed upon plurality rather than consensus; the goal is the representation 
of competing interests and there is no undertaking to actually use the information gathered. 
This model reflects a restricted liberal view of the state’s role as an arbiter of conflicts 
between individual interests,
60
 something which is both empirically questionable
61
 and also 
open to distortion, as decision-making processes centred on bargaining may be dominated by 
vested interests, whose capacity to organise their representative resources is greatest, leading 
to partisanship, instrumentalism, and regulatory capture.
62
 Thin deliberative processes tend to 
be narrowly-drawn, meaning that they reflect a predetermined range of outcomes and so 
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empower those who set the agenda.
63
 They are also not truly deliberative, since the 
preferences of actors exist a priori and are not mediated by deliberative participation, 
remaining the same at the end of the process as they were at that start.
64
 Political risk 
management is thus dominated by an agenda that tends towards the superficial, and which 
involves only one, limited, version of public attitudes.  
Together, these objections illustrate that ‘thin’ deliberation centres on the gathering of 
preferences as input into policy processes, rather than the generation of outputs that reflect 
deeper citizen engagement. This focus on input rather than output is central to the approach to 
public consultation taken by the UK government in recent years, perhaps reflecting the 
British regulatory state’s deep-seated institutional inclination towards top-down, centralised 
bureaucratic policy-making, which efforts at ‘modernization from above’ have not dimmed.65 
Government practice has been driven by concern over the unresponsiveness of regulatory 
systems to the external social needs they should fulfil, and while ‘thin’ deliberative processes 
construct the appearance of responsiveness, using them to tackle this problem exposes their 
fragility. These fragilities are especially pronounced in policy areas which are contested by 
populist social agendas, and indeed, thinly deliberative processes may be utilised precisely in 
order to allow these agendas to permeate the policymaking process.
66
 When political actors 
identify latent movements that are sympathetic to their ideological preferences, but which 
lack the formalised rigour required by mechanisms of evidence-based policy engagement,
67
 
public engagement may be employed as a means of imbuing notionally objective processes 
with this particular political agenda. Expert evidence is thus weighed against a conception of 
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‘public concern’ which is objectivised as an alternative form of ‘evidence’ via deliberative 
engagement. This process has been reflected in the UK’s ongoing health and safety reforms 
since 2010, where thin deliberation has been used to embed an ideological, populist view of 
health and safety at work regulation within a policymaking process that can be mapped across 
the four stages (experimentation, interaction, institutionalization, internalization) of Berger 
and Luckmann’s model of social reality construction. 
EXPERIMENTATION: NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW RHETORIC 
The reshaping of regulatory capacity prior to 2010 was driven by the strategic framing of 
regulatory compliance in rationalistic terms, something which was arguably constructed 
mutually by business duty-holders and governmental actors,
68
 and which provided a basis for 
the subsequent development of a wider account of regulation and its social role. This account 
has underpinned the extension of those beliefs beyond issues of intervention and into other 
areas of regulatory policy, including the boundaries of the regulatory framework itself.
69
 A 
powerful public narrative of ‘health and safety gone mad’, a resistance to regulation fuelled 
by hostile media coverage which documents examples of regulatory unreasonableness, 
heavy-handedness, and excess, has risen to prominence during the last fifteen years or so.
70
 
Stories about children being forced to wear safety goggles to play conkers, or about any 
number of other situations in which regulators are alleged to have stepped into the realm of 
absurdity, are a commonplace and recurring feature of media debate. These ‘regulatory myth’ 
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stories coalesce around a set of well-established core themes, such as a challenge to some 
form of traditional activity and the use of humour to critique regulators, but they also retain a 
degree of non-specificity which renders them hard to definitively disprove. Like other 
compelling story forms,
71
 this mixture has ensured their prominence within public discourse. 
But as well as being popular, regulatory myth stories are also political phenomena, in that 
they challenge the legitimacy of regulators and are indicative of a principled objection to the 
bureaucratic over-reaching of the state and the risk-aversion of modern society.
72
 Their core 
messages about the unreasonableness of state-imposed external constraints on the freedoms 
of private economic actors to determine the appropriate balance of risk and reward also 
reflect the fundamental principles of a neo-liberal approach to regulation.
73
 Regulatory myths 
form part of a political dialogue about the undesirability of regulatory burdens and, despite 
the efforts of HSE to publicly rebut these stories,
74
 by the mid-2000s, it was clear that they 
were increasingly being drawn upon to support influential currents within political thought 
and ideology.
75
 While in opposition, David Cameron cited a number of regulatory myths 
when criticising a “health and safety...culture [which] has infected every part of our life”,76 
and stating that “[W]hen children are made to wear goggles by their headteacher to play 
conkers...what began as a noble intention to protect people from harm has mutated into a 
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stultifying blanket of bureaucracy”.77 Once in power after the 2010 election, his Government 
set out to roll back the state and tackle safety laws which had “encroached into various 
different parts of national life [by, for instance]...stopping Bonfire Night...”,78 invoking 
regulatory myths to frame the idea of deregulation as in the public interest. The 2010 election 
manifesto of the Conservative Party, the dominant partners in the coalition Government, 
undertook to reduce the amount of regulation and red tape that applied to business, and 
(referencing one key strand of regulatory myth story) amend “health and safety laws that get 
in the way of common sense policing”.79  
From the outset, then, the ambition to reform and restrict the scope of the existing health and 
safety laws was present within the Government’s policy agenda. But this particular, 
individual commitment was only meaningful for those who were similarly committed to a 
small-state political agenda; a degree of experimentation was required in order to render it 
both coherent and accessible to a wider audience. As such, the linkage of this commitment to 
the wider cultural tropes contained within regulatory myth stories constituted an experimental 
attempt to develop a new understanding of the reality of regulation, one which links wider 
processes of individual sense-making about visible phenomena (myth stories) to an 
overarching explanatory framework of ideas (about deregulation). This ‘bottom-up’ approach 
to the creation of meaning via practical experience and first-hand exposure is a common 
feature of many contexts within which understandings of health and safety are generated, 
particularly given the relatively low levels of latent knowledge about broader health and 
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safety regulation, and practice.
80
 A social narrative already existed around this area of 
regulation, but a process of experimentation with meaning allowed for that narrative to be 
appropriated as a core feature of future policy, forging an understanding of restrictive 
unreasonableness, red tape, and regulation as an area of policy that interferes with individual 
self-determination, as interrelated concepts which cumulatively provide a clear sense-making 
framework for use in this area. 
INTERACTION: THE YOUNG REVIEW AND THE ‘RED TAPE CHALLENGE’ 
In June 2010, just a few weeks after its election, the coalition Government launched a formal 
review of health and safety regulation. Lord Young of Graffham, a Conservative peer, was 
commissioned to report on ‘the rise of the compensation culture over the last decade coupled 
with the current low standing that health and safety legislation now enjoys’,81 and quickly 
made clear his guiding assumptions: “We have decided to apply [health and safety] across 
all parts of life, which is a nonsense...It has become a music hall joke...My job is to put 
commonsense back in and deregulate it”.82 The terms of reference and scope of the report 
were both clearly influenced by the experimental sense-making agenda around health and 
safety that had previously been constructed, as well as a similar narrative about a 
‘compensation culture’.83 The Review was happy to accept from the outset that health and 
safety law had suffered a collapse of public legitimacy as a result of its over-reaching 
tendencies,
84
 and that the scope of health and safety regulation must necessarily be bounded 
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by the need to avoid compromising the economic interests of business.
85
 The excessive costs 
of health and safety compliance were evidenced by reference to regulatory myths, making the 
interplay between perception and practice central to the subsequent Review. 
Young made a series of recommendations relating to the ‘compensation culture’, centred on 
the streamlining of the civil litigation system and the regulation of claims management 
companies.
86
 In relation to health and safety, he recommended reducing the requirements 
incumbent upon low-hazard workplaces and simplifying the legislative framework in order to 
return to the principles of proportionality underpinning the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974.
87
 In doing so, Young voiced principles which were well-established within regulatory 
circles,
88
 but the detail of these proposals was not concrete; what is regarded as a ‘low-risk’ 
workplace is unclear, as are the meanings of ‘simplification’ and ‘exemption’. The report also 
recommended the removal of restrictions upon good Samaritans, adventure sports, school 
trips, and children’s play areas,89 and the creation of an Ombudsman to allow individuals to 
challenge unreasonable safety decisions. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Young 
Review was the extent to which it explicitly linked these concrete issues of policymaking to 
the experimental sense-making account of health and safety outlined in the previous section, 
conflating perceptions and substantive realities as a result; it concluded that the compensation 
culture was an issue of “perception rather than reality”,90 but proposed substantive reforms 
to the law in order to tackle this perceived problem. And in relation to health and safety law, 
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it recognised that many of the stories that underpin that sense-making account of regulation 
are misperceptions, driven by a media agenda,
91
 but also accepted the content of those 
misperceptions as a basis for decision-making. 
The Review undertook interaction with a wider public constituency via two mechanisms: a 
consultation process which gathered responses from stakeholders, and an engagement with 
mediated popular opinion via the regulatory myths that were cited, neither of which made any 
claims as to deliberative breadth. The former involved a relatively low-key engagement with 
businesses, interest groups, representative organisations, trades unions, and self-selecting 
individuals who responded to an invitation to comment; this was translated by Young into a 
self-contained series of observations, mostly about the problem of negative media coverage, 
but a few of which identified a lack of regulatory clarity and the problems of over-burdening 
businesses.
92
 The latter was a means of engaging with public concern by proxy, treating 
adverse media commentary as both a problematic phenomenon, and as an indicator of a 
popular mandate for change. Reform was thus required because “many are the reports of 
activities and events banned...in the name of health and safety”,93 which highlighted a system 
gone wrong. Crucially, this step allowed for the development of an emergent, shared 
understanding around this issue, recasting otherwise technical, obscure issues of regulatory 
policy via the medium of easily-accessible, public narratives of ‘health and safety gone mad’, 
using the pessimistic outlook of the latter to evidence a need to change the former, and thus 
binding government ideology and public perception into something approaching a whole. 
It must be recognised that the Young Review was a political undertaking. It was conducted 
by a former Conservative Government Minister who had overseen a previous era of 
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deregulatory initiative during the 1980s,
94
 and was commissioned early during the Coalition 
Government, seemingly so that the Conservative faction within it could show an ongoing 
commitment to politically symbolic elements of its election manifesto. As such, it was always 
likely to be heavily concerned with issues of public perception. Nevertheless, Young’s 
engagement with external input was highly selective and the Report gave more prominence to 
anecdotal evidence than it did to the evidence provided by the consultation respondents. In a 
sense, this highlights one of the key problems associated with thinly deliberative processes; 
the opportunity for input provided is not counterbalanced by a clear commitment to testing 
the validity of that input through processes of sustained citizen engagement.
95
 By privileging 
the insights that regulatory myths are claimed to provide (at the same time as decrying their 
ubiquity), the Young Review both validated them and used them to legitimate its own 
ideological preferences. The openness of the review process was sufficient to allow for 
consideration of evidence which was of limited factual veracity and inherently deregulatory 
in nature, suggesting that the process was designed with just such an outcome in mind.
96
 
The Young Review was supported from April 2011 onwards by the ‘Red Tape Challenge’, 
conducted by the Cabinet Office. This involved the opening up of government via public 
consultation as part of a citizen-led “fight back” against red tape,97 a shorthand term for an 
essentially objectionable form of bureaucratically-embedded constraint.
98
 In this sense, the 
Red Tape Challenge was framed from the outset as a deregulatory process, in accordance 
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with the emergent Governmental understanding of health and safety regulation as costly, 
ineffective, and obstructive. This process was significant because of its deliberative 
component; it sought to harness the power of the internet to elicit the opinions of the public 
sphere,
99
 and to channel this information into the decision-making process as a representation 
of democratic preference. This was a public forum, and did not seek to engage with expert 
opinion or specified stakeholders. As such, it fitted the model of ‘thin’ and pluralistic public 
consultation outlined previously. Health and safety was one of the six core themes singled out 
for attention and attracted 1320 responses, a significant proportion of which were very 
hostile, citing the economic costs of regulation and the lack of self-reliance that it instilled in 
individuals.
100
 Many respondents cited examples that were drawn from ‘regulatory myth’ 
stories or narratives of tort law excess, which the Red Tape Challenge then reproduced for 
subsequent consumption by formal government bodies.  
The Red Tape Challenge illustrates clearly the ‘mutual adjustment of perceptions’ that 
constitutes the second, interaction stage of Berger and Luckmann’s model. The input 
gathered via ‘thin’ deliberative engagement was limited to surface-level expression of 
opinion rather than outcomes of any open and ongoing processes of deliberative 
engagement,
101
 and so did not test the truthfulness of these beliefs,
102
 but rather allowed for 
them to be shared and reinforced. The rhetorical framing of the process as a ‘Red Tape 
Challenge’ pre-empted its findings and positively invited comments questioning the 
legitimacy of regulation, and this ‘agenda-setting’103 shaped participants’ understandings in 
accordance with the established ideological narrative that the Government was seeking to 
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develop.
104
 The conjunction of regulatory myths and a dislike of ‘red tape’ with a more 
principled neo-liberal objection to intervention in the private sphere of the workplace was 
central to this process of consultation, and while particular stories of excess were only 
occasionally linked to subsequent reform proposals,
105
 their wider impact was to reframe the 
agenda in terms of a public resistance to health and safety regulation grounded in ‘common-
sense’ ideas that should properly be regarded as natural and beyond debate.106 And once these 
understandings were embedded in a ‘comprehensive’ survey of public attitudes, and 
communicated in an authoritative policy document, they became increasingly ‘objectivised’ 
as concrete social facts.
107
 Subsequent outcomes would be judged against the supposedly 
universal, common-sense principles of individualised (rather than mandated) decision-
making, rationalized (rather than universal) intervention, and business-oriented (rather than 
welfarist) regulation that this thinly-deliberative process was designed to find support for. 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE LÖFSTEDT REVIEW 
The centrepiece of the Government’s reform process was Professor Ragnar Löfstedt’s review 
of health and safety. This was commissioned in March 2011 via the Government’s ‘Good 
Health and Safety, Good for Everyone’ policy document,108 which also announced a 
significant cut to HSE’s enforcement regime, including reductions of one-third in the rates of 
scheduled inspection, particularly of “businesses in lower risk areas”.109 It also pre-
emptively answered some of the questions that Löfstedt was supposed to address by asserting 
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that the costs of regulation were too high, and “the burden of health and safety red tape [is] 
too great”, pointing to the (by now) objectivised social fact of a “health and safety culture 
that causes so much frustration in Britain today”.110 At the same time, it set out the terms of 
reference of the Löfstedt review, which were to analyse the costs and benefits of health and 
safety regulation, to investigate the ‘gold-plating’ of European Union regulations, and to 
identify “where health and safety regulations have led to unreasonable outcomes”.111 These 
terms of reference reflect the common-sense shared understandings and assumptions (things 
“everyone knows” to be true112) to have emerged via the preceding interaction stage: top-
down rule-imposition leads to unreasonableness and red tape; regulation must be risk-based, 
proportionate, and targeted at the problematic minority of duty-holders; and the need for 
business competitiveness demands that regulations be minimalist
113
 and economically-
rational.
114
 Arguably, Löfstedt’s own appointment was an act of framing; as a respected 
researcher who had previously advocated risk-based approaches, but whose background was 
sufficiently distant from local debates about health and safety regulation, his likely focus on 
due process would not involve reopening the partisan debates that Young and the Red Tape 
Challenge had already settled. In a sense, authorial neutrality was a means of ensuring that 
decisions would be made within the terms of the emergent social reality. 
The Löfstedt report was published in November 2011 and made wide-ranging substantive 
recommendations, including the revocation and amendment of several pieces of obsolete 
legislation, the consolidation and review of regulations and Approved Codes of Practice, and 
the simplification of online risk assessment tools, reflecting concerns about the volume and 
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complexity of the law that echo those of the Robens Committee 40 years before.
115
 Overall, 
though, the report concluded that the existing law was “broadly fit for purpose”, and Löfstedt 
observed that “I have neither seen nor heard any evidence to suggest that there is a case for 
radically altering or stripping back current health and safety regulation”.116 The report was 
less ambiguous than Young when handling regulatory myths, acknowledging that they were 
problems of perception, inaccurate media constructs which damage the regulatory system,
117
 
and which demanded solutions (simplification, targeting, risk communication) that addressed 
their causes. 
Like Young, Löfstedt undertook a consultation process with stakeholders, in line with the 
Government’s desire for deliberative regulatory policymaking,118 and instituted a bipartisan 
and tripartite advisory panel to assist in the formation of his report. This provided an 
opportunity for input from a wide range of bodies, many of whom would have been highly 
critical of the direction of government policy. And while Löfstedt was able to consider the 
submissions made via the Red Tape Challenge, these were not drawn on explicitly within the 
report that was produced. All of this, when combined with Löfstedt’s commitment to 
evidence-led policymaking and independence from political interference, meant that, while 
the Review was open to criticism due to its relatively narrow evidence-base,
119
 it remained a 
broadly constructive document which emphasises continuity and improvement rather than 
wholesale change. But there were three key areas where the Review’s findings seemed to 
directly reflect the framing of regulation as a common-sense matter of individualised, 
rationalized, and minimalist intervention. The focus placed onto these issues within 
Löfstedt’s formal, authoritative report also institutionalized them (Berger and Luckmann’s 
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third stage of objective reality-creation) as legitimate norms and expectations that should 
shape future policy decision-making, something which subsequent reactions to Löfstedt’s 
findings have accentuated. 
Firstly, a change was proposed in relation to strict liability, so that existing duties which 
make employers liable for injury caused by their acts or omissions regardless of fault should 
be amended by adding a reasonable practicability defence or by precluding liability. The 
‘problem’ of strict liability in the health and safety context has long been overstated,120 and 
there are few cases where such defences do not already apply, meaning that just three 
examples could be referenced within the review.
121
 Yet the importance attached to the idea of 
employees using strict liability to bring frivolous claims against employers suggests that it 
symbolises a broader concern about paternalist interventionism infringing upon common-
sense principles of individual responsibility. The Government’s response to this proposal, the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s.69, precluded breaches of duty under health 
and safety regulations from being actionable in civil law unless otherwise specified (reversing 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 s.47’s presumption of actionability unless otherwise 
precluded). Löfstedt himself subsequently expressed concern at the impact of a reform that 
was “more far-reaching than I anticipated in my recommendation”122 and that would heavily 
restrict the right of workers to seek compensation for injuries caused by their employers, but 
by this time, the embedded notion of regulation as a matter of individualised responsibility 
had been institutionalized further into law. 
Secondly, Löfstedt proposed making exempt from health and safety law “those self-employed 
whose work activities pose no potential risk of harm to others”, a category that was left 
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undefined, but was apparently envisaged as including freelance clerical workers and the 
like.
123
 Again, by institutionalizing the notion of universal, rather than rationalized, 
regulatory coverage as a source of unreasonableness, the Review provided an opportunity for 
the pursuit of more fundamental reform. The Deregulation Bill, which will imminently 
become law,
124
 proposes an exemption from health and safety law of all self-employed 
workers except those who work in one of a prescribed list of ‘high-risk’ sectors, a much more 
substantially deregulatory presumption than Löfstedt had envisaged. As Black and Baldwin 
observe, “‘low risk’ means, in practice, ‘low priority’” and this decision reflects a set of 
embedded value judgements about the legitimacy of regulation
125
 and the emergent, 
‘common-sense’ notion of rationalized regulation that was being used to frame the issue of 
health and safety. By linking self-employed risk-taking and the rejection of the 1974 Act’s 
principle of comprehensive coverage to the concerns of the small business lobby and the 
perceived problem of ‘regulatory creep’, the Löfstedt review institutionalized the idea of non-
universality as an evidenced principle of regulatory policymaking, something that was now a 
taken-for-granted norm and expectation for the future. 
Thirdly, Löfstedt recommended that HSE be given oversight of local authority health and 
safety regulation (which largely encompasses the retail, offices, and hotel sectors) and the 
power to redirect enforcement in line with national models and away from “relatively low-
risk workplaces”.126 Local Authorities are sometimes accused of acting as ‘risk bullies’,127 
operating to different (overly restrictive) standards than HSE when allocating regulatory 
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resources. Löfstedt was ostensibly concerned with remedying these inconsistencies and 
providing greater certainty for duty-holders, but also made reference to the poor trust profile 
of Local Authorities,
128
 which regularly feature in regulatory myth stories and critical 
accounts of health and safety regulation. Local Authorities are portrayed as too legalistic and 
inclusive in their approach, focusing on breaches and workplaces that ought not to receive 
attention within a targeted enforcement regime, something that is incompatible with the risk-
driven model of regulation that informed the Review’s terms of reference. A new National 
Local Authority Enforcement Code
129
 was introduced to embed this recommendation; this 
restriction of the range of possibilities open to regulators constituted a process of agenda-
setting of accepted ‘ways of doing things around here’130 within the scope of the 
institutionalized ‘common-sense’ (and anti-interventionist) approach to regulation already 
embedded within the policymaking process. 
INTERNALIZATION: THE POST-LÖFSTEDT WORLD 
The Löfstedt report was formally accepted after publication and the majority of the 
recommendations were promptly implemented.
131
 While it aimed to take a dispassionate, 
evidence-led approach to reform, it still provided a means by which a set of policy choices 
relating to a deregulatory shift could be brought into the policymaking process. The 
deliberative and evidence-based modes of inquiry that it adopted were not sufficient to break 
out of the broader framing of health and safety law that had preceded it. And while the 
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recommendations that Löfstedt made were, in general, relatively incremental in nature, they 
have been consistently overstepped by the Government in enacting subsequent reforms, 
demonstrating the degree to which this frame of reference has been internalized by those 
involved in the policymaking process. As an accepted basic assumption about ‘the best way’ 
of doing things, the sense-making framework of regulation as red tape and interference with 
individual self-determination has led to an increasingly proactive pursuit of outcomes that are 
aligned with an ideological commitment to this ‘common-sense’ account of health and safety 
regulation. So the Löfstedt report’s conclusion that “the focus should be on clarifying legal 
requirements...rather than cutting back on the regulations themselves”132 mutated into a 
Governmental undertaking to, by “implementing the recommendations...reduce the number 
of health and safety regulations by more than 50 per cent”.133 While some of this difference 
of emphasis is due to subsequent political capital being made from the reform process, it also 
results from the validation of deregulation as a goal to be pursued by government and against 
which the value of a policy can be measured.  
Two subsequent initiatives illustrate the embedding of this common-sense approach to 
regulation within the regulatory imagination, not only of policymakers and government, but 
also of the wider public. A ‘Mythbusters Challenge Panel’ was created to scrutinise 
disproportionate health and safety decisions referred to it by the public, and this body has 
ruled on 336 cases, mostly regulatory myth-based (as of December 2014).
134
 The invocation 
of citizen input here provides a means of reinforcing and internalizing the core assumption 
that individualized, rationalized, business-oriented decision-making is the expectation against 
which regulators should be measured. Citizens should seek out and report cases that do not 
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conform to the new orthodoxy of health and safety regulation, and the collation of these 
reports in a visible, high-profile form serves to verify that this understanding is right by 
recreating them as examples to discuss and reflect upon, thus forming part of the “routine 
maintenance of everyday life”.135 The notion of a common-sense approach to regulation is 
expressed again in the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill, recently passed into 
law by Parliament,
136
 which requires a court to take into account the fact that a person who 
may have breached a statutory or common-law duty was acting heroically or for the benefit 
of society when adjudicating on their potential liability. The Bill appears to be a symbolic 
reaction to some of the regulatory myths discussed (and, indeed, refuted) by the Young and 
Löfstedt reviews
137
 rather than a substantively meaningful change to the law; it is best 
understood as an engagement with the ‘realities’ of the common-sense conception of health 
and safety regulation as a matter of undue interference with individual freedoms.  
One key feature of this new social reality of health and safety regulation has been that 
political rhetoric around the issue has become arguably more belligerent than at any time in 
recent memory, with the Government “determined to stamp out the health and safety 
killjoys…[and] root out needless bureaucracy”,138 and “kill off the health and safety culture 
for good...[and] get a lot of this pointless time-wasting out of the British economy and British 
life”.139 This new climate, and the assumptions made about the value of individualised, 
rationalized, and business-oriented regulation have set the parameters for a series of 
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subsequent developments that reflect this new social reality. The emergence of newly 
‘marketised’ regulatory strategies, such as ‘Fee for Intervention’, whereby HSE will 
undertake cost recovery when it intervenes in response to breaches of the law,
140
 has been 
made possible by the internalization of these new norms. Within this symbolic universe, 
individualism and personal responsibility are seen as the fundamental basis of social and 
economic relations and, as with the compensation culture narrative, individuals are presented 
as “rationally calculating, self-interested actors” who act in accordance with the economic 
calculation of their own self-interest.
141
 Health and safety is thus reframed as a matter of self-
interested exchange, rather than a universal, welfarist social goal, and thus as a cost to be 
divided up and allocated between parties. 
Similarly, the promulgation of a seemingly UK-influenced deregulatory agenda at European 
level by the High-Level (Stoiber) Group on Administrative Burdens, which recommended the 
adoption of key principles of regulatory minimalism, non-universality (exemption), and 
economic rationality to tackle excessive red tape,
142
 exists within the same policy frame of 
reference. This reflects one of Löfstedt’s key recommendations, namely, that British 
policymakers and politicians should engage more fully with European Union-level processes 
and institutions to ensure that new legislation is evidence-led and risk-based.
143
 But the 
Stoiber Group is a consultative, stakeholder-led institution which was created in order to 
reduce burdens on business, and has long acted as a repository for deregulatory impulses and 
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advocacy at the European level. This mode of engagement with the UK’s European partners 
is best understood as an effort to widen the scope of the symbolic regulatory universe 
constructed in the UK and embed the processes of experimentation and interaction, and thus 
the establishment of a dominant deregulatory agenda, at a European level. For the most part, 
then, rather than the measured discussions about risk that Löfstedt advocated, the reform 
process has created a new adversarialism around the politics of regulation, and driven the 
internalization of a dominant narrative of health and safety regulation which then constrains 
the range of possibilities that subsequent policymaking can consider. The new orthodoxy of 
health and safety policy is dictated by the notion of common-sense regulation as an 
individualised, rationalised, minimalist undertaking, and this is the frame within which all 
subsequent decision-making must take place. 
CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE REFORM PROCESS 
The public sector reforms that have followed the post-2008 economic crisis have not simply 
been pragmatic cost-cutting measures; public sector budget-setting is also a regulatory tool, 
allowing governments to exert control over policy via the medium of money.
144
 The rolling-
back of the health and safety system during this period has ideological underpinnings that 
predate these spending reviews and speak to more fundamental conceptions of the role of the 
state, something which subsequent initiatives claiming deliberative capacity and evidence-
based rigour have embedded. Central to this conception is the notion of regulation as a form 
of ‘red tape’ which stands in opposition to common-sense notions of individualism and anti-
interventionism. But, as Gouldner observes, “red tape as a social problem cannot be 
explained unless the frame of reference employed by the individual who uses this label is 
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understood”.145 As with other areas of debate about the governance of social and economic 
relations, such as those around the compensation culture,
146
 employment grievance 
procedures,
147
 or political lobbying,
148
 regulatory reform is shaped by the ‘truth claims’ used 
as framing devices by actors within the process, particularly those occupying positions of 
power.
149
 In the case of health and safety regulation, unlike these other examples, the 
emphasis has been less upon the advancement of an explicitly pro-business agenda, and more 
upon the establishment of a new orthodoxy in the framing of issues of regulation in 
accordance with one particular set of values.  
The notion of ‘common-sense’ regulation was developed through experimentation with 
particular forms of public and government truth-claim, and introduced into the policymaking 
process via thinly deliberative processes of public engagement and interaction, such as the 
Red Tape Challenge and the Young Review. It was then institutionalized via the Löfstedt 
Review’s official stamp of objectivity, which endorsed these truth-claims, and internalized 
via subsequent enactments which placed this new understanding at the centre of the ongoing 
reform agenda. Notions of self-reliance, state intervention as interference, economic 
rationality, and a rejection of universal coverage, have been transformed from doctrinal 
features of a particular ideological approach to regulatory analysis, into a set of foundational 
assumptions about what regulation can, and ought to, look like. This constitutes a significant 
shift, moving health and safety policymaking away from political debate about the relative 
merits of regulation and towards the acceptance of taken-for-granted truth-claims which exist 
                                                     
145
 Gouldner, op.cit.n.92, 411. 
146
 Morris, op.cit.n.83. 
147
 Edelman et al., op.cit.n.68. 
148
 G. Gray, ‘Insider Accounts of Institutional Corruption: Examining the Social Organization of Unethical 
Behaviour’, (2013) 53 Brit. J. Criminology 533. 
149
 S. Bittle and L. Snider, ‘From Manslaughter to Preventable Accident: Shaping Corporate Criminal Liability’, 
(2006) 28 Law & Policy 470; Parker, op.cit.n. 141. 
35 
 
‘beyond politics’. The result is a new symbolic universe of meaning, outside the scope of 
direct contemplation, which exerts great influence over the direction of thought and action. 
It is particularly significant to recognise the role played by deliberative engagement within 
this process of social reality construction. By facilitating input into policy-making, 
deliberative processes are intended to ensure that the interests of those outside the formal 
sphere of political and economic influence are represented; by retaining a commitment to 
values of rationality, openness, and inclusiveness, the resultant outcomes should represent the 
best settlement of general social interests.
150
 But we have seen that, in the context of health 
and safety policymaking at least, the use of ‘thin’ forms of deliberative engagement has 
allowed for processes of interaction and institutionalization to take place which have 
embedded a particular ideological approach to regulation, and which have given primacy to 
certain, established interests, ideas, and narratives. In part, this is because a lack of 
commitment to the core values of meaningful engagement set out above has allowed a social 
reality grounded in misperception to take hold, but it is also due to the permeability of these 
processes, which permit entrenched, powerful interests to shape the outcomes of the policy 
process.
151
 At every stage, a neo-liberal, small-state agenda of individualised, business-
oriented, narrowly-targeted regulation has exerted considerable influence over the direction 
of policy to an extent that more explicit input from those advocating deregulation would be 
unlikely to achieve. This is the final irony; that mechanisms which open the formal, top-down 
process of regulatory policymaking to a wider range of interests can be so effectively 
redirected by the bottom-up, informal influence of processes of social reality construction 
which bear the imprint of a much narrower and more particular political and social agenda.  
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